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Abstract
Accountability policies have become more important in the educational sectorover the last two decades. Arguing that these policies focus increasingly on thetechnical core, some scholars have recently challenged the enduring findingthat classroom activities and teachers’ practices are largely decoupled fromtheir institutional environment. In this paper, we argue that this discussioncould be enriched by taking into account the processes through whichaccountability policies are developed and implemented. Two contrastedprocesses of construction and implementation are compared regarding theextent to which they have an impact on the level of decoupling between theformal structure of evaluation and the teachers’ practices. The results show thatcompared to the bureaucratic approach to educational reform, the networkmodel of organizing is more favourable to the emergence of social andcognitive changes, which contribute to reduce the level of decoupling betweenthe evaluation’s mechanism and the teachers’ practices.1
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Resumen
Las políticas de responsabilidad se han vuelto más importantes en el sectoreducativo en las dos últimas décadas. Argumentando que estas políticas secentran cada vez más en la base técnica, algunos teóricos han desafiadorecientemente el hallazgo perdurable de que las actividades del aula y lasprácticas docentes están en gran medida desconectadas de su entornoinstitucional. En este trabajo sostenemos que esta discusión podría enriquecerseteniendo en cuenta los procesos a través de los cuales se desarrollaron eimplementaron las políticas de responsabilidad. Se realiza una comparaciónentre dos procesos contrastados de construcción e implementación respecto alnivel de impacto en la disociación entre la estructura formal de evaluación y lasprácticas de los profesores. Los resultados muestran que en comparación con ella aproximación burocrática a la reforma educativa, el modelo en red de laorganización es más favorable para la aparición de cambios sociales ycognitivos, que contribuyen a reducir el nivel de disociación entre elmecanismo de evaluación y prácticas de los profesores.
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educational systems, schools and teachers (Eckstein & Noah, 1993; Lee,2008). Arguing that these policies focus increasingly on the technicalcore and intensify the pressures from the institutional environment onschools and classrooms in more substantial ways, some scholars(Coburn, 2004; Sauder & Espeland, 2009; Spillane, Mesler, Croegaert& Sherer, 2011) have recently challenged one of the most enduringfinding from the institutional studies of public schooling, that is thatclassroom activities are largely decoupled from their institutionalenvironment. Extending this emerging literature on the implementation ofaccountability policies in education, the main objective of this paper isto understand to what extent and through which processes the modes ofconstruction and implementation of the instruments of externalevaluation affect their institutionalization at the school level. Twodistinct modes of construction and implementation are compared,regarding the extent to which they have an impact on the level ofdecoupling between the formal structure of evaluation and the teachers’practices. The first is basically bureaucratic. Here, the instruments ofexternal evaluation are designed by a central bureaucracy; then, togetherwith comparatively formal rules for their use, they are sent to eachschool. In this case, the accountability policy is implemented on aschool­by­school basis. The second involves networking by local actorsand intermediaries to create policy and provide support for itsimplementation. Here, in addition to the instruments created at thecentral level, evaluation instruments are created within networks ofprincipals and inspector, and relayed locally by principals. In this case,authority and accountability are based on the social relationshipsbetween network participants. In this paper, we argue thatorganizational forms (e.g. networks or bureaucracies) mediateinstitutionalization. We suggest that the network mode of organizingmore than the bureaucratic one stimulates the micro­foundations(Colyvas & Powell, 2006; Hallet & Ventresca, 2006; Barley, 2008;Hallet, 2010) of the institutionalization process. We argue thatorganizational forms (network vs. bureaucracy) influence the ways that
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teachers interact with each other and their principal around the externalevaluation, and the level of legitimacy attached to the externalevaluation, which might lead to influence the level of coupling betweenthe evaluation mechanism and the teachers’ practices. To investigate these analytical dimensions, a qualitative comparativestudy was conducted within the educational system of French­speakingBelgium. Natural variations in how the instruments of externalevaluation were developed and implemented in schools within thiseducational system were used to compare the network model ofimplementation to the bureaucratic approach to reform. Theinstitutionalization of the external evaluation was studied within eightschools split in two districts2 differentiated from one another by thepresence in one of them of a local mechanism for external evaluationdeveloped and supported by a network of inspectors and principals. The paper extends the literature on the reception of the accountabilitypolicies in education in three ways. First it opens a reflection line on theinfluence of the mode of construction of the accountability policies ontheir reception, while most previous studies (Spillane, Mesler, Croegaert& Sherer, 2011; Sauder and Espeland, 2009; Hallet, 2010) neglected theimpact that the processes through which the accountability policies weredeveloped might have on their implementation at the school level.Second, pursuing the pioneering work of Coburn (2001), it brings atheorization of the mediating mechanisms through which differentmodes of policy construction enhance or inhibit the re­coupling betweenthe institutional environment and the actors’ actual practices. Third itexplores how forms of collaboration between organizations andhorizontal patterns of exchange play in the institutionalization processof the accountability policies, while the dominant view of institutionalchange is that it is driven by organizational competition (Ingram &Clay, 2000; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The paper is structured as follows. First, our study is situated at theinterface of two literatures: the literature on the implementation ofaccountability policies in education and the one on networks andinstitutional change. Second, the qualitative study is described. Third,implications of the present study are discussed.
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Literature review
The implementation of accountability policies
The development of external evaluation and accountability policies hasrenewed the debate on the coupling between the institutionalenvironment and the teachers’ practices. This debate has lead to somecontrasted positions and arguments. Some scholars (Sauder andEspeland, 2009; Hallet, 2010) suggested that accountability policiesforced schools to couple tightly their activities to the institutionalenvironment and pressures, while others (e.g., Ball, 2003) defended onthe contrary that schools resist to these new pressures by fabricatingidentities that protect them. Sauder and Espeland (2009) used MichelFoucault’s concept of discipline for understanding why higher educationorganizations are unable to buffer themselves from the institutionalpressure generated by educational rankings and market­basedaccountability. They suggested that disciplinary practices like thecontinuous surveillance and the normalization associated with rankingsof organizations impel them to reinterpret their practices and internalizenew self­conceptions, even in situations where buffering would bedesirable for these organizations. Ball (2003) also anchored his analysisof performativity regimes in a foucaldian perspective, but put moreemphasis on the resistance made locally by the British schools andteachers to reject the new self­conceptions linked to the performativityregime (promiscuous and enterprising self, with a passion forexcellence). He argued that in order to respond to the increasingnational targets, indicators and evaluations in England, schools andteachers organize themselves and fabricate inauthentic individual andorganizational identities. These fabrications contribute to decouple thecore activity of schools and professional identities of teachers from theinstitutional pressure generated by the high­stake accountability policyin England. In the middle of these two positions, some scholars investigated theextent to which the variations in the level of coupling are linked to intra­organizational explanations. Using the concept of organizationalroutines as analytical tool, Spillane, Mesler, Croegaert & Sherer (2011)found that within­school administrative practices mediate relations
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between the external environment and classroom instruction. Theyshowed that staff designed and redesigned organizational routines in aneffort to couple administrative practice with both the externalenvironment and with the technical core, and that the nature ofinteractions among school staff and the distribution of leadership helpunderstanding the differences in the coupling level. Hallet (2010) maderecently quite a similar argument based on a longitudinal ethnographicstudy anchored in a neo­institutionalist perspective. He studied how theteachers and the principal of one school (re)coupled their practices andidentities to the accountability’s myth and found that the recouplingprocess was first associated with an experience of epistemic distress andsecondly with an evolution of the meaning attached to the accountabilitypolicies that lead most teachers of the school to contest theaccountability­based approach and the legitimacy of the actors whoinitiated the recoupling. This second element shows that socialinteractions gave teachers the opportunities to think critically about therecoupling process and the transformation of identities and practicesgenerated by the accountability policies. All in all, the issue of the influence that accountability policies haveon the recoupling between the institutional environment and theteachers’ practices has been examined either by foucaldian analysesemphasizing tight coupling and resistance or by studies looking at theimpact of social interactions and processes of formal and informalleadership within school. But to our knowledge the literature leftunexplored the role that the construction and the implementation of theaccountability policies might play in the dynamic of recoupling. Tobegin this reflection, two modes of construction and implementation ofstudents’ external evaluation are compared. The first is basicallybureaucratic and the second is a network model of construction andimplementation.
Bureaucratic vs. network forms of organizing
In the classic literature on schools as organisational forms (Bidwell,1965), schools have been described as (professional­) bureaucraciesmostly impermeable to systemic reforms. Since the 19th century,education is organized in large bureaucracies managed by political
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systems, as many other social activities that came under political andbureaucratic control in modern societies (Meyer & Rowan, 1983). Theemergence of large­scale educational organizations has been interpretedthrough rationalist arguments (Bidwell, 1965), and next, within the neo­institutionalist perspective (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), through culturalones. This last perspective considers that the source of theseorganizational features is the surrounding macro­level societal order,which diffuses societal myths, ideologies and norms as to whatparticular organizations should be (Ingersoll, 1993), but also that theenvironmental pressures on organizations are largely limited to theirstructural characteristics and do not affect much their core technology.This means that in schools, instruction tends to be removed from thebureaucratic control, leaving instructional activities and outcomesuncontrolled and uninspected (Meyer & Rowan, 1983). However, the development of new control designs (Rowan, 1990) andaccountability via the external testing of students has reopened theexploration of the decoupling argument. Some studies (e.g. Spillane etal., 2011), most often conducted in educational systems characterized byhigh­stakes accountability systems, emphasized on the importantdiversity in the response of schools to the accountability pressures andproposed intra­organizational explanations to this diverse pattern ofrecoupling. So doing however, they neither have examined per se therole of bureaucratic mechanisms (e.g., rules and hierarchy) in theinstitutionalization of these new modes of regulation, nor haveexplained how the school differences in terms of recoupling might belinked to institutionalization processes at the field level. In this paper,our objective is to explore these aspects, by comparing bureaucraticmodes of implementation to network forms of organizing. Recently indeed, some scholars (Wohlstetter, Malloy, Chau &Polhemus, 2003; Smith & Wohlstetter, 2001) raised the issue of the rolethat alternative organizational forms to bureaucratic mechanisms mightplay in the implementation of educational policies. Smith & Wohlstetter(2001), for instance, analyzed a public school reform (the AnnenbergChallenge) as an example of reform through school networks. The basicobjective of the reform was to improve the efficiency of publicationeducation in most large urban areas in the US. Schools came togethervoluntarily to create school families and build collaborative capacities to
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innovate, which gave the opportunity to study the functioning of whatthese authors characterized as affiliation networks. They found thatnetworks have important social correlates that explain the enhancedcapacity of schools for reforming their practices. They showed thatreforming through school networks implies the transformation ofdecision­making structures that became largely concentrated in cross­site teams, the emergence of new leadership patterns centred on thenetwork leaders rather than on the principals, and important changes inthe type of authorities. They particularly underlined the role of sharedbeliefs in the formation of authority and in the distribution of leadership,making appear that networks also had cognitive correlates thatinteracted with the social ones.
Network and institutionalization
In this paper, we argue that micro­foundations of the neo­institutionaltheory (Colyvas & Powell, 2006; Hallet & Ventresca, 2006; Barley,2008; Hallet, 2010) permit to theorize the social and cognitive correlatesof the network model of policy construction and implementation, anddescribe the mediating mechanisms through which this organizationalform can influence the institutionalization of new social practices inorganizations. We suggest that the network mode of organizing (morethan the bureaucratic one) stimulates the micro­foundations of theinstitutionalization process. This conception of institutionalization as amicro­process (Colyvas and Powell, 2006) emphasizes on the activerole and the reflexivity of organizational members, and differs from theidea that the institutional change proceeds only through (macro andmeso) mimetic, coercitive and normative pressures that imposethemselves to organizations. The institutional change is not thought as apassive absorption of environmental influences. The (micro)­institutionalization of new social practices is considered to be mediatedby internal work practices through which routines, categories andidentities are developed that compress and stabilize the values, themeanings and the kind of use attached to the new organizationalpractices. This conception of the institutionalization as internal to theorganizations, active and reflexive provides us the theoretical anchoring
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for thinking about the cognitive and social correlates of the networkmodel of organizing (Smith and Wohlstetter, 2001). First, we argue thatthe institutionalization of the external evaluation through networking,more than through bureaucracy, is accomplished by modifying the typeof social relationships between the teachers and their principal andfacilitating the establishment of roles, practices and local socialcategories around the external exams. Second, we argue that social andcognitive correlates are interdependent, meaning that the transformationof relations and roles brought about by the network model of organizingleads to increase the legitimacy of the external evaluation and theevaluation process (which included the content of the evaluationinstrument), and to favor the development, the internalization and thenaturalization of transformed representations of the teaching profession.These representations associated with results­based regulation revolvearound the twofold idea that, on the one hand, teachers are responsiblefor the results of their students and, on the other hand, the results of theexternal evaluation had to serve as an information base to modify theirteaching practices. Our final argument is that as a consequence of thesesocial and cognitive correlates, the network mode of policy constructionand implementation increases the recoupling of evaluation structuresand teaching practices.
Method
The Belgian context: centralization, external evaluation andaccountability
The educational system of French­speaking Belgium is particularlypromising ground for exploring our research questions, both forhistorical reasons and due to recent changes in educational policies.Historically, the Belgian school system was established as a highlydecentralized system. The Belgian Constitution for instance begins notby defining what education should be, but by recognizing thelegitimacy, even the prime importance, of private initiatives ineducation (citation removed). Even in 1914, when education up to acertain grade level became mandatory, the state refrained frominterfering with Catholic schools, which would necessarily have
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involved investigating what schools actually did. Since the end of the1990s, however, under the political authority of the French­speakingcommunity, regulatory and legislative activity has tended to standardizeinstruction, and has made the situation of subsidized schools (Catholicand municipal schools) similar to that of schools under direct statesupervision. New rules have been established, principally in two areas:definitions of common requirements for programmes of instruction, andteaching personnel status. Nonetheless, the emergence of the state as akey coordinator has not been achieved by denying the importance oflocal forms of teachers’ work coordination. During the late 90s, the stateemerged as an evaluative state (Neave, 1988), meaning that it definedstandards and monitored the extent to which they are attained throughexternal evaluation organized at the end of primary school, but that itallowed some autonomy to schools in selecting strategies to achievethese standards. In such an institutional context, one can easily understand that inBelgium’s educational system, the evaluation of students hastraditionally been a prerogative of local. The control exercised by theState over educational institutions being weak, the competent authoritiesfor schools3 have been free to define curricula, pedagogical approachesand, a fortiori, evaluation practices for a long time. In the XX century,certain competent authorities introduced common exams for the sixthyear of primary school. These exams took varying trajectories, but havenow been abolished and replaced in 2009 by an exam that is common toall competent authorities and leads to certification. Also, for about thelast ten years, external evaluations for diagnostic purposes of whatstudents have learned have increasingly been used in basic education(citation removed). By “external evaluation”, we mean all evaluations of student learningnot devised by a teacher or a local educational team but, rather, createdand implemented by actors external to the classroom setting. InBelgium, these types of instruments are not created or organizedexclusively by the State (French­speaking Community) but also bysome competent authorities or more rarely at the district level. Someexternal examinations have official status and are constrained by legaltext, while others are informal (typically those organized at the districtlevel), having taken a completely different approach in order to be
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accepted by the various actors involved. We now turn to the descriptionof the external evaluation separately for each district.
Mechanisms of evaluation in districts A and B
External evaluation in district A
Primary schools from the “district A” are confronted to two types ofexternal evaluation. They have exams leading to certification in the 6thyear of primary school. These exams are relatively new, though theyrely in part on previous exams (later eliminated) set up by somecompetent authorities like the Catholic network of schools. An exam isconstructed every year and awards successful candidates the Certificatd’Etude de Base (Basic Education Certificate; hereafter referred to asthe CEB). Exam results are not allowed to circulate. They must not beused to determine the position of students in a class or to rankeducational institutions. These exams are sent to schools by the centraladministration. The correction is organized locally by the inspectors viaa “production line” by bringing together several schools and results aresent back to the central administration. Finally schools get the results oftheir students individually. But since 1994, schools also have external evaluations not leading tocertification. They have been devised for the entire French­speakingCommunity. Every school year all students in 2nd and 5th year ofprimary education (7 and 11 years of age) take part in an externalevaluation dealing in turn with the reading/production of written work,mathematics and sciences/geography (tri­annual rotation). The tests areheld at the beginning of the school year. Again the results are notallowed to circulate or be used to rank educational institutions. Theyserve a “diagnostic” role (a) for teachers individually and (b) formanaging the “educational system” as a whole. The teachers receivecomparisons dealing with their classes together with the results of thesystem, as well as “pedagogical advices4” derived from problemsidentified at the system level. This feedback is intended to help theteachers to know in which discipline they must improve their results andwhich kind of teaching practices are appropriate for that.
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External evaluation in district B
In district B, primary schools have the same external exams as schoolsfrom district A. But importantly for the purposes of this study, they alsohave external evaluations developed at the district level throughnetworking between inspectors and principals. The network was builtover the last 15 years on the initiative of two inspectors who proposedprincipals from the district to participate voluntarily to the conception ofexternal exams. At that moment, no external exams were organized bythe state. The inspectors claimed that in this period they “worked insecret”, did not inform their hierarchy of their initiative and did notreceive the support of their other colleagues in the district. They livedwith the fear of being criticized and having their project stopped, sincethey knew they were modifying existing standards and the rolesassigned to the various actors, especially through the links they werecreating among actors of different education competent authorities(catholic vs. official). They also terminated their limited roles asinspectors in order to produce instruments of knowledge that wouldprovide advice and decision­making support for the principals andteachers. In the beginning, some principals who were not under theresponsibility of these two inspectors participated to the network; theytold of how they discretely obtained the exams through their colleagues­­ principals already participating in the mechanism. Today, “it has become a large and complex bazaar”. All of theinspectors in the district have now joined forces to support theevaluation mechanism involving just over 200 schools (98% of schoolsin the district)5. About a hundred principals from different networks areinvolved in the creation of two exams (2nd and 4th years of primaryschool) every school year. Ten working groups6, each consisting of 10principals, are formed. The exams are held at the end of the school year.Compliance with test instructions, and the exact time and place of thetest are the responsibility of the principal and the teaching staff. Theyare very similar in terms of the type of questions asked and the form ofthe exam to the exams created at the French­speaking Community level(CEB and diagnostic exams). In most of the schools, the tests serve ascertification exams for teachers who, consequently, no longer make uptheir own final exams. The teachers encode the results on an Excel
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spreadsheet directly connected to the inspectors’ computers. Theinspectors analyze the exam results and create graphs; they include intheir analysis the results of the non­certification exams held in theFrancophone Community and the CEB. The analyses are distributed toboth teachers and principals. Very often, the results are commented onand discussed at meetings, but also during individual interviews withprincipals and teachers. Beyond their modes of construction, the distinctiveness of theseexams resides in the statistical treatment carried out afterwards by theinspectors, and in the way results and analyses are communicated toteaching staff. Each teacher receives the results of this statisticaltreatment in two different forms (synchronic and diachronic). Acomparative synchronic analysis of the relative value (to the districtaverage) of the performance of their class and their school wasprovided. A comparative diachronic analysis was also developed basedon the results of external evaluations for several school years, includingas well the results of external evaluations organized by the French­speaking Community. This involved comparing the results of the sameclass at different times.
Data collection
The present research paper forms part of a European­funded researchproject, which has set itself the objective of examining the role of“knowledge” in the development and socio­genesis of public policy andpublic action. The research material was collected in two stages. In the exploratory phase of the research, teachers, inspectors and theindividuals in charge of creating and distributing external evaluationinstruments were met in order to improve our knowledge of the context,and of external evaluations carried out in the French­speakingCommunity. The exploratory interviews allowed us to identify, withinone district (which we call “District B”), a particular external evaluationmechanism that seemed to structure a significant part of the socialrelations and practices within the district. Most of the local actors(inspectors, principals and teachers) signed on to this mechanism,though their support (at least in the case of the inspectors and principals)was voluntary.
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 Following the exploratory interviews, the research was pursued intwo distinct districts: (1) “District A”, where no external evaluation wasadded locally; (2) “District B”, where external evaluations wereadditionally set up for the district. Natural variations in the way thepolicy of external evaluation is developed and implemented were thusused to explore our research questions. To maximize the validity of thecomparison, 1) district A was selected for its similarities with district Busing information­oriented sampling and 2) schools from district B werematched as much as possible with schools from district A regardingtheir social composition (advantaged, disadvantaged or mixed), theirmembership in the different competent authorities (Catholic network vs.the network of local public authorities), their geographic setting (rural orurban environment) and their size (from 1 to 4 classes per educationallevel). Nonetheless, one must note that district B differentiated fromdistrict A on some dimensions different from the local mechanism forexternal evaluation, which calls for caution in the interpretation of thelinks between the modes of external evaluation mechanisms’construction (bureaucratic vs. network) and their institutionalization atthe school level. District B was now experiencing greater socialdifficulties, which explain why schools from District B have on averagea lower social composition. It was a region where industrial activity hadbeen extensive, and industrial redevelopment was in full swing onseveral levels. District A was a more rural region, where economicactivity was more stable and based to a greater extent on the tertiarysector and agriculture. Beyond the fact that parts of the differences between the two districtsare probably not due to differences in the modes of policy constructionand implementation, one must also note that the comparison betweenthe two districts is a comparison between two mixed forms of policyconstruction and implementation. The network and the bureaucraticmodes represent ideal­types (Weber, 1971). It is particularly importantto nuance that the network mode of construction and implementation islimited in its characterization by 1) the limited amount of exchangebetween the organizations (the exchanges are essentially organizedaround the external evaluation, even if over time, exchanges betweenthe principals largely extended to new aspects, different from theexternal evaluation) and 2) the limited participation of categories of
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actors to the network (the participation is limited to the schoolprincipals). The bureaucratic mode of policy construction andimplementation is also limited in its characterization by 1) the fact thatthe Belgian educational system is traditionally highly decentralized and2) the spreading of authority between different constituents. However, itcan be argued that the organization of the external evaluation in French­speaking Belgium is a typical example of the emergent centralization ofthe educational competencies in French­speaking Belgium, even if thatdoes not fully restrict the local initiatives as it is the case in District B. Semi­structured interviews were conducted with the teachers affectedby external evaluation within each school and with the principals (seeTable 2). In total 32 interviews were conducted, 16 in each District (3 inschool A1, 4 in school A2, 6 in school A3, 3 in school A4; and 4 ineach school from District B). In District A, the interviews focused onthe teachers in second (confronted to the non­certificate evaluation) orsixth (confronted to the certificate evaluation) grade, while they wereequally spread over teachers from the three “cycles”7 in District B. Theinterviews with the teachers were centred on the following categories:perceptions and uses of the external evaluation, and perceived effects ofthe external evaluation on the teaching practices and the socialrelationship in the workplace. In order to capture as best as possible thelevel of coupling/decoupling (as perceived by the teachers), teacherswere systematically asked to describe the extent to which, according tothem, the external evaluation had effects on lesson planning, teachingmethods, teaching materials, student (internal) evaluation, learning paceand classroom management. Interviews lasted between half an hour andone hour and half and were systematically transcribed. The interviewsconducted with the school principals focused on the same categories(except for the systematic questions on the impact of the externalevaluation on the classroom practices) but also on general context of theschool and its history. Aside from the interviews with the teachers andschool principals, document analyses were also performed to fullyunderstand the diversity and uses of the instruments used in the FrenchCommunity. The type of feedback given to schools within the district Bby the inspectors as well as the kind of pedagogical advices derivedfrom the central diagnostic evaluation were analyzed.
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Table 1School matching in the two districts
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Socialcomposition Membership Geographicalsetting School sizeA1 Advantaged Catholic Rural Medium
A2 Mixed State Urban Big
A3 Mixed Catholic Rural Big
A4 Mixed State Rural Medium
B1 Advantaged State Rural Medium
B2 Mixed State Rural Big
B3 Disadvantaged Catholic Urban Big
B4 Disadvantaged Catholic Rural Medium
Table 2Interviews conducted in the two districts
Actors District A District B
Principals 4 4
Teachers, cycle 1 5 4
Teachers, cycle 2 0 4
Teachers, cycle 3 7 4
Data analysis
The main categories of our theoretical setting were systematically codedin the interviews conducted with the teachers and principals in the twodistricts using NVivo Version 8.0. The level of coupling/de­couplingbetween the teaching practices and the external evaluation mechanismwas coded by referring to the categories of analysis suggested byCoburn (2004). Four categories were kept in our own analyses: de­coupling, the symbolic response, accommodation and assimilation. In
Coburn's words (2004): decoupling happens when “schools respond topressures from the institutional environment by decoupling changes instructures from classroom instruction”, symbolic responses when“teachers responded to pressures symbolically, rather than in ways thatinfluenced classroom routines, organization, use of materials, orapproaches to instruction” (p. 224), assimilation when “the teachersdrew on their tacit worldviews and assumptions to construct theirunderstanding of the content and implications of messages” (p.224) andaccommodation when “the teachers engaged with pressures from theenvironment in ways that caused them to restructure their fundamentalassumptions about the nature of their teaching practices or students’learning” (p. 226). The legitimacy associated with the external evaluation by the teachersand the school principals were coded in two steps. Firstly types oflegitimacy were coded by distinguishing between the cognitive,pragmatic and moral types of legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). Thecognitive legitimacy refers to the most commonly used “taken­for­granted” (or socially­accepted) status. In our analyses, the cognitivelegitimacy mainly referred to the taken­for­grantedness associated withthe idea of external evaluation itself and the cognitive principlesassociated with results­based regulation. The moral legitimacy refers tothe social values associated with the external evaluation by the teachers,while the pragmatic legitimacy involves, in the definition given bySuchman (1995), the self­interested calculations and concerns of themost immediate actors. In this paper the pragmatic legitimacy is simplyredefined as the evaluation by the teachers and the school principals ofthe appropriateness and the validity of the external evaluation’sprocedure (test construction, data collection, data analysis, resultscommunication). Secondly each quote related to a category oflegitimacy was coded according to their level, by distinguishingbetween low, medium or high level of legitimacy. The practices, roles and social categories were firstly coded withreference to the theory of local institutionalization as discussed byColyvas and Powell (2006). In this paper, quotes were coded as socialpractices, roles or categories when the teachers and the school principalsdescribed the 1) social practices developed to organize locally theexternal evaluation and make sense of the results, 2) the shift and the
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differentiation of professional roles attached to the external evaluationand 3) the use of common language and semantics to discuss issuesrelated to the external evaluation. As it has been done to the coding ofthe legitimacy, the different categories (social practices, roles andcategories) were secondly coded according to their level, bydistinguishing between low, medium or high level of social practices,roles and categories. More details on the coding process and categoriescan be found in appendix. Results are now presented, district by district. First social andcognitive correlates of the policy modes of construction andimplementation are described. Second their relationships with the formsof coupling/de­coupling are examined.
Results
The social side of institutionalization: social practices and roles
The type of leadership exercised by the principal varied according to thepolicy’s construction and implementation modes. More principals inDistrict B schools than in District A schools (with the likely exceptionof school A2) strongly supported and legitimized their actions based onthe external evaluations and results obtained by their schools.
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"We meet with our principal in order to analyze our results (at theexternal evaluation) … He explains us our strengths andweaknesses. He shows us some graphs indicating whichcompetences we need to improve. And next we meet with ourcolleagues to explore solutions … It’s true that we are more andmore scrutinized" (School B2 – C1)
 The four principals of this District created a set of practices designedto ensure that the teachers took the external evaluation seriously, thatthe teachers were familiar with, and had analyzed and understood theirstudents’ results, and that a variety of measures would be taken toremedy deficiencies brought out by the evaluation.
"Mr. X (the principal) organizes meetings during the school time inorder to discuss the results and conceive new pedagogicalactivities, adapted to the kids’ difficulties … In the beginning it
 These practices were diverse: finalizing the presentation of the resultsto bring out any changing trends; collective and/or individualcommunication of the results to the teachers; participation in teachermeetings designed to analyze the results of the external evaluation (B2and B3); and collecting information from teachers on the changesimplemented to improve the weakest results obtained in the evaluation(B2 and B3). In the district B, the participation of the principals in the constructionof the external evaluation enabled them to improve their knowledge ofpedagogical approaches per se.
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was hard to think differently about my practices, but now thethings are improving and that motivates us" (School B3 – C1)
"It (the external evaluation) has really changed the relationships Ihave with my teachers! You know, it gives much credit to my role…When they become aware that my knowledge of the pedagogicalcontents is up to date, and even sometimes better than theirs, itreinforces much my interventions on their classroom practices"(Principal B2)
 It also allowed them to improve their knowledge and understandingof (a) the results­based regulation model, (b) the concrete mechanismfor its implementation, and (c) the public action referents on which thismechanism was based (in particular, the core competences delineated bythe French­speaking Community). In sharing this knowledge with theteachers, the principals were able to play a central role in the new localsocial structures implemented around the external evaluation; improvetheir credibility in the eyes of the teachers (in one school, they wereeven viewed as the local expert whose skills were required to provide avalid interpretation of the results and comprehend their implications);and narrow the gap between the management structure and what washappening at the classroom level. A contrario, in the schools of the district A, the principals intervenemuch less in classroom or other pedagogical matters. In three out of thefour schools, the action of principal was largely decoupled fromteaching practices. This was particularly clear when it came to theexternal evaluation.
 One principal only in district A paid attention to the teachers’ use ofthe external evaluation results. The three other principals contentedthemselves with circulating them and were mostly unconcerned by thefact that the teachers had taken the necessary steps to improve the leastdeveloped competences of the students in the school. Nonetheless, inone school in this district (school A2), the leadership provided by theprincipal was closer to the type of leadership observed in the schools ofthe other district. Referring to the results obtained in the externalevaluation, the principal of this school invited the inspectors to aprofessional development day on the difficulties revealed by theevaluation; its purpose was to initiate a discussion on measures to betaken to remedy these difficulties. She also requested and made sure thatthis discussion continued in the grade meetings. However, the structuresdesigned by the principal vis­à­vis the evaluation results were not onlycomparatively specific and responsive (whereas in the other district,regardless of the content of the results, the external evaluation wasaccompanied by local mechanisms), but also not as fully accepted bythe teachers, who felt, to an even greater degree than in certain DistrictB schools, under pressure and controlled by the external evaluationmechanism. The analysis of the differences between the two districts in terms ofthe leadership of the principals has already revealed that in District Bthe implementation of the external evaluation was accompanied by atransformation of the most important roles. What about the roles,structures and social practices in a broader sense? Also, it seems that inDistrict B (the “network” district) to a greater extent than in District A(the “bureaucratic” district); relations among teachers were modifieddue to the introduction of the external evaluation. Directly related to thesocial practices initiated by District B principals, the local coordinationand division of work in this district revolved more than in District Aschools around the external evaluation. By way of the consultations
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"We have many discussions with our principal and with ourcolleagues – particularly with my colleagues teaching in the samegrade as I ­ about the difficulties we face daily, but we nearly nevertalk about the external evaluation. It is true that we are preparingourselves to the evaluation, but I am not sure it really influenceswhat we do during the whole school year" (School A1 – C1)
among teachers, analyses of the results were established and certainpractices designed to remedy possible difficulties noted in the externalevaluation were initiated.
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"We analyze for each item the results of our school, and where ourpupils are situated (compared to the pupils of the District) … andnext we organize long meetings during which we are not disturbedin order to find solutions, to work on specific problems of learningand to construct new set of exercises and learning activities"(School B3 – C3)
 Teachers in two schools (B2 and B3) also mentioned the impact ofthe external evaluation on the division of work. In school B3, this wasmanifested as a new division of competences, to be developed, in thevarious teaching “cycles”, in mathematics and science. In school B2, itwas through the adoption of a new mathematics textbook using thecompetency­based approach that a new division of competences, to betaught in the various teaching cycles and years, was introduced. Incertain schools the external evaluation also seemed to have an impact onhow teachers were compared. This impact seemed more meaningful inDistrict B schools, where district policy on the communication of theexternal evaluation results focused on the performance of each class.However, it seems that in this regard the guidelines set down by theprincipal when presenting the results played a more decisive role thanthe policy of communicating the results of the inspection. In the schoolswhere the emphasis was placed on collective performance (more oftenat the school level, for example in A3), the feeling that the teachers hadbeen placed in a situation of competition was less evident than in theschools placing greater emphasis on individual performance on theexternal tests (for example in B4). The same is true regarding the existence of social categories andtechniques shared by staff at the local level. Indeed, it seems that inDistrict B schools, common semantic and linguistic levels were createdto make sense out of the external evaluation results. The level to emergethe most clearly was that of effectiveness in teaching. Several teachersand principals interviewed (here, one could also include certaininspectors in the district) used categories developed within this researchtrend (School Effectiveness Research). Thus, on the one hand, some
differentiated between school composition effects and practice­relatedeffects, and, on the other hand, between class effects and teacher effects.
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"With the evaluation, we are able to know whether the results aredue to a class­effect or to a school­effect. So when the results (of agiven teacher) are due to a class­effect, he is directly questioned inhis practice" (Principal B3)
 It is also interesting to note that the use of these categories, whichwere designed to balance different factors (the part of studentperformance attributable to teachers and that attributable to exogenousfactors) played a subtle role in getting teachers to assume greaterresponsibility. This was because the latter tended to employ thesecategories to refer to the part of student performance attributable to theirpractices, than to cast their students’ performance in a relativistic light,especially in schools with a more underprivileged population.
"We were disappointed by the results (of the external evaluation)and suffered because of them … there had been more failures thanin other schools and we took it hard. I know that the population ofmy school is underprivileged, yet we need to obtain normal resultssince the name of the game is to have zero failures" (Principal B4)
 Obviously, the use of this category to get teachers to assume greaterresponsibility was not unconnected to the use to which this was put byinspectors in the district, who created their indicators with a view toimmediately excluding school­population effects and thus avoiding thepossibility that teachers would shun their responsibilities. What can be said about the relations with the inspectors? Did themode of construction and implementation of the external evaluationaffect the way they performed in the schools and the relations theyestablished with local staff? Once again, there was a difference betweenthe two districts; it involved the teachers’ perception of the importanceattributed by the inspectors to the external evaluation and the results.Indeed, in District B the vast majority of teachers and principals made avery strong connection between the inspectors and the externalevaluation. In certain schools (B1 et B3), this seemed to emerge throughjoint local meetings organized by inspectors, either to explain theexternal evaluation at the district level or to analyze the results obtainedby the school. This connection was clearly less common in District A
schools, where several teachers (especially in A4 and A3) claimed to beunaware of what the inspectors did with the results of the externalevaluation.
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"It’s really rare for us to have opportunities to talk with ourinspector about the evaluation. And when we have, we do notdiscuss the core of it. The debate is rather technical" (School A3­13)”; “I don’t know exactly what they do with the results (of theexternal evaluation). I guess that they are interested in developinga global point of view, but I am not sure" (School A4 – C1)
 However, school A2 constituted an exception, since, at the request ofthe school principal, some of its teachers had recently been inspectedfollowing poor results obtained by the school in the external evaluation.Consequently, in this school not only did the teachers make a strongerconnection between the external evaluation and the inspectors, but somealso brought up the existence of a difficult relationship with theinspectors, since they felt they were under great pressure. For this reason, did this stronger association, perceived by local staffto exist between the inspectors and the external evaluation, modify theteachers’ relations with their inspectors? In the two districts, the relationwith the inspectors continued to be marked by a fear of being inspected(i.e., that the latter was based exclusively, as was most often the case inDistrict A, on standard compliance monitoring, or on monitoringextended to the use teachers made of evaluation results, as was mostoften the case in District B, and especially in school B3). It also seemsthat the intensity of the teachers’ fear of inspection depended, on the onehand, on the quality of the personal relationship the inspector formedwith the staff and, on the other hand, past experience with inspection.Nevertheless, a special characteristic arose in district B where theinspectors worked with the principals to develop external evaluationtests. To a greater extent than in district A, the external evaluationinstruments led to conciliation between the inspectors and the teachers,and that it tended to increase teachers’ trust for their inspector. Thisrelationship of trust was indicated not only by the instrument but also bythe inspectors’ mechanism accompanying the external evaluation results(for example, by presenting the evaluation mechanism to local staff, oreven by helping staff interpret the results and look for ways to improve).
 Thus, more often than not, the teachers in this district had anambivalent relationship with the inspectors, one affected by a fear ofmonitoring and a trust inspired by the social and technical mediation ofthe tool. In addition, in specific cases the teachers found it difficult todeal with this ambivalence. Thus, there were cases where an inspectormight make an individual visit to a class, and the teacher had to dealwith a relationship with the inspector that was based strictly onmonitoring. In such cases, the teacher might not be able to deal with thesituation very well and end up questioning the relationship of trustestablished via the instrument.
Table 3Social practices, roles and categories by district
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District A District B
Social practices Continuity in the socialpracticesNo clear linkbetween the externalevaluation and the socialpractices
Intensification of thecollaboration between theteachers and the principal,and of the collaborationbetween the teachers
Teacher collaboration, andcollaboration betweenteachers and the principalstrongly centered on theexternal evaluation
Social categories No common semantic levelscreated Strong reference to theschool effectiveness researchcategories
Roles and identities Continuity in principalleadership Principal leadership shift
Up to this point, the social correlates of the construction andimplementation modes of external evaluation were examined. We willnow focus on another major characteristic of the institutionalization ofthese tools at the local level, namely, the creation of a legitimaterelationship with these tools ­ the cognitive correlates. It isaccomplished by dissociating cognitive, pragmatic and moral forms oflegitimacy.
The cognitive side of institutionalization: construction of local formsof legitimacy
It seems that the construction and implementation modes play asignificant role in the process that links the local acceptance ofevaluation instruments to the cognitive principles giving them meaning.Indeed, the analyses suggest that the dual concept of the increasedassumption of responsibility by teachers and the inclusion of theexternal evaluation in a perspective of continuous improvement ofteaching practices was much more evident among teachers in District Bthan it was among teachers in District A. Most teachers from district Bseemed to experience their profession as a performance, one for whichthey are in large measure responsible.
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"It’s up to the teacher to determine why something went wrong;we’re obliged to challenge our own positions (School B4 ­ C1)”;“It’s up to us to do the re­evaluation (School B4 – C3)” ; “We arein a constant state of self­questioning, it’s very demanding, wenever know if we’re on the right path, it’s hard” (School B2 – C2);“That’s the judgment made: you either succeed or you don’t;classes are compared and the results are attributed to differentmethodologies" (School B4 ­ C1)
 This finding confirms the theoretical proposition advanced byColyvas and Powell (2006) on the very nature of the institutionalizationprocess, as well as propositions advanced by Weick (1995) on the roleof exchange and communication processes in the stabilization oforganizational routines and interpretations. It does this by revealing theextent to which the institutionalization of an organizational practice isbased on the one hand on reducing the ambiguous character of thispractice and on the other hand on a legitimization of the collectivecognitive model chosen by the organization’s members to make sense ofthe latter. The analyses also show that in schools from the District A,characterized by fewer social practices centered on the externalevaluation, teachers have less internalized the cognitive principles of theaccountability policies. Most teachers from this district have felt lessresponsible for their students’ performance and have less perceived that
results of the external evaluation are relevant information to improvetheir practices.
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 Only some 5th and 6th grade teachers described feelings of guiltabout the results as well as significant feelings of responsibility.
"I do not think that the results (of the external evaluation) reflectwhat I do in the classroom with the kids during all school year … Ithink that teachers are the best placed to evaluate the truecompetencies of the kids (School A3 – 31)”; “I prefer to organizeregular evaluation myself to diagnose their difficulties and not tosimply say: they have that or that level. My evaluations are morehelpful (School A1 – C1)”; “I doubt on its relevance (of theexternal evaluation). I feel that we could do almost anything, aslong as the results are good it's ok. And I think it's bad because it'svery easy to give good grades to the kids" (School A1 – C3)
"It’s a two­edged sword: they’re not harmless, since individualsare being evaluated, compared, judged; we feel judged even if theyinsist this is not the case; our work is being called into question"(School A2 – 32)
 But importantly, they have never made the link between thesefeelings and the perspective of being in a state of continuousimprovement. This shows that even teachers from this District who areconfronted to an external evaluation leading to certification have notreally internalized the “regulation schema” underlying theaccountability policies. This interpretation will be next confirmed whenanalyzing the level of coupling between the evaluation mechanism andthe practices of these teachers.
Table 4Social practices, roles and categories by district
District A District B
Cognitive legitimacy Lower internalization of thecognitive principlesassociated with theaccountability policies
Higher internalization of thecognitive principlesassociated with theaccountability policies
Pragmatic legitimacy Administration proceduremore often contested Higher credibility of theevaluation mechanism
Moral legitimacy Very few reference Very few reference
The level of pragmatic legitimacy appeared also contrasted according tothe modes of construction and implementation of the policy, but lessthan the cognitive one. In the district where the construction andimplementation of the external evaluation were carried out by a network(District B), very few actors interviewed challenged the evaluationmechanism and even less the validity of the statistical treatment, eventhough technically speaking some of the indicators were questionable asto the relevancy and reliability of what they were seeking to understand.
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“The evaluations are very well conceived. The documents onwhich the evaluations are based are appropriate. And the fact thatthe evaluation is the same for each teacher helps us to question ourpractices" (School B1 – C1).
  A contrario, more teachers and school principals from District Ahave contested the administration procedure of the test and the testitself.
“I feel that people who conceived the tests are not teachers … Theway items are formulated makes them difficult while they are not!And that causes them (the students) problems … Moreover the testadministration is very different from one school to another. Insome schools, the test is administered in the students’ class. It isvery different for us. Our students are grouped with students theydon’t know and are given very unusual conditions for evaluation.So how can you compare the results? They obviously cannot beequal!" (School A2 – 32)
 They have shed doubt on the equality of treatment during theadministration and challenged in consequence the comparative value ofthe test performance and its role for regulating the teaching practices.We also noted that this contestation was more significant in mixed ordisadvantaged schools, whatever their district. Finally teachers from both districts have made little reference tosocial values to judge and make sense of the developing externalevaluation. Some teachers from both districts underlined that theirsupport for the external evaluation mechanism was related to theobjectives of “equality of treatment” for students, even if some teachersfrom District A (mainly teachers from school A2) contested that theseobjectives were reached.
 Till now, mediating pathways associated with the construction andimplementation modes of external evaluation were described. Resultsrelating to the decoupling will now be analyzed by replying to thefollowing question: was there a difference between the external exam’smode of construction and implementation in terms of the decouplingbetween the evaluation mechanism and the teaching practices?
External evaluation and coupling/decoupling
The modes of policy implementation (see Table 5) also appeared to belinked to the reported level of coupling of the external evaluationmechanism and the teachers’ practices. In the district where theconstruction and implementation of the external evaluation proceededmainly bureaucratically (District A), the form of coupling that largelydominated was the symbolic response (8 teachers out of 12, see Table6). For the teachers, the latter consisted in keeping the pressures of theinstitutional environment at a distance by adapting their practices at themargins and making the implemented transformations visible.Essentially, this was expressed through (a) a modification of the internalevaluation practices, with a view to making them adhere as much aspossible to the test­taking conditions of the external evaluation, and (b)even, and especially in the cycle 3, through coaching given by theteacher in how to take external exams.
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“What I changed is not so much in my way of working, but muchthe way I prepare the students to this type of evaluation” (SchoolA3 – 31)”; “I make them pass the tests of last years. It is importantto make the kids familiar to this type of questions and to showthem the kind of performance that is expected from them (SchoolA3 – 31)”; “After Easter we will resume the tests of last year to doa mock exam with the kids. First to get them used to the type ofitems, and next to the functioning of the evaluation itself" (SchoolA2 ­ 33)
 Other transformations displayed on a more regular basis by theteachers in this district were also close to the symbolic responsecategory; these included reprogramming learning objectives accordingto the results of the external evaluations, or intensifying the pace of
learning during the months preceding the external evaluation, so as tomaximize student performance in this evaluation. In this district, therewere more symbolic responses among teachers in cycle 3, which wascompleted by a certificate evaluation. Three more obvious cases ofdecoupling were revealed among teachers in other cycles. In rarer cases(2 of the 9 teachers coded), symbolic responses seemed to bear the markof accommodation. It was particularly evident in a sixth year teacherwho essentially coached her students for the external evaluation,prepared them using old exams or used the exams of the previous yearto situate her students in relation to the requirements of the CEB.However, in one subject (science studies) she also used pedagogicaladvices to carry out her own evaluations and substantially modified herteaching sequences, by focusing them more on experience and a processof discovery and competency construction by students. On the other hand, accommodation was the most frequent response ofteachers (9 teachers out of 12, see Table 7) in the district where theconstruction and implementation of the external evaluation occurred in alocal network (District B). The transformations reported by the teachersin terms of their practices all revolved around an increased applicationof a competency­based pedagogy: organizing lessons around acompetency rather than a subject; conducting experiments serving as thebasis for learning, particularly in sciences; and language­learningactivities anchored firmly in the reading of documents.
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“Initially my teaching practices were very systematic, butevaluation after evaluation, I changed them importantly. Theadaptation is necessary, not only to be accountable to theinspection, but mostly for the students (School B3 – C3)”; “Icannot say anymore that I teach now the same as I did ten yearsago. The students’ evaluation has changed, and the methods also.It is particularly clear when I teach science. I do not ask themanymore to study definitions; I prefer to make them readdocuments, do experiments, interpret graphs, etc. (School B2 –C2)”; “The external evaluation modified some of our practices.The greatest changes were in the teaching of measurementcompetencies. Some years ago we taught separately themeasurement of weight, distance and volume for instance. Andnow, we try to integrate much more these different competencies
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 The scope of the changes varied considerably. Some teachers saidthey designed a lesson using a competency­centered approach, andbased it on students’ failures in specific areas of the evaluation; othersseemed to have brought this approach into general use, either inparticular disciplines (in the present case, early­learning studies andmathematics were the disciplines most frequently cited) or in all of theirteaching practices. One response was coded as “assimilation”, therebyindicating that the changes introduced by the teacher were in line withtheir personal practices. There was another interesting aspect to thisdistrict: the transformations to the teaching practices did not specificallytarget teachers in the final cycle but were, rather, extended to thevarious stages of the organization.
Table 5Dominant types of coupling/decoupling at the district level
by integrating them in real situations and by teaching them allalong the school year" (School B4 – C2)
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Table 6Type of coupling at the teacher level (District A)
































Table 7Type of coupling at the teacher level (District B)





























Note: The category of coupling/decoupling was assigned to each teacher as a function ofthe dominant category coded in their interview.
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Discussion
The purpose of this paper was to understand to what extent and throughwhich processes the modes of construction and implementation of theinstruments of external evaluation affected their institutionalization atthe school level. Natural variations in the modes of construction andimplementation of the instruments of external evaluation in theeducational system of French­speaking Belgium were used to comparethe network model of implementation to the bureaucratic approach toreform. Results from this comparative study show that more than thebureaucratic approach to educational reform, the network model oforganizing stimulates the micro­foundations of the institutionalization,which contribute to reduce the level of decoupling between theevaluation’s mechanism and the teachers’ practices. This study participates to the elucidation of the factors that explainthe local variations in the level of coupling between the accountabilitypolicy and instruction. Authors like Sauder and Espeland (2009) arguedthat accountability policies, more than other strand of policy ineducation, forced schools to couple tightly their activities to theinstitutional environment and pressures. Our analyses showed that in aninstitutional environment into which accountability policies are beingdeveloped, the reception of the external evaluation instruments and theinstitutionalization of an output­based regulation are highly variable anddepend, at least partially, on the processes by which the externalevaluation have been developed and implemented in schools. In thedistrict characterized by a network model for reform, the significanceand the weight of the external evaluation mechanisms were foundlargely different than in the district characterized by bureaucraticapproach. The “district” external evaluation was used by the teachersfrom District B for certification; it supported internal pedagogicaldiscussions that tended to involve all teachers whatever the grade theyteach in (and not only the teachers in the particular grade evaluated);and it justified, called for and even “forced” teachers to re­evaluate theirown beliefs and actions for the purpose of change in terms of workorganization or teaching practices. This study also points out that the network effect on theinstitutionalization of the external evaluation at the school level is
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largely mediated by the development of social practices, categories androles on one hand, and by the construction of local forms of legitimacyon the other hand. It appeared that the changes in the social practices inschools from District B were mostly linked to a shift in the principalleadership. The participation of school principals to the construction ofthe external evaluation instruments improved their knowledge of theevaluation mechanism and its pedagogical content, and increased theirlegitimacy in the eyes of the teachers. Their authority thus becamereinforced by its coupling with a new expertise (evaluation tools andanalysis) which fuels in turn their pedagogical leadership. Theprincipals in District B influenced the re­coupling in two inter­relatedways. They initiated a direct control of the teaching activities byattending lessons or by following­up of the pedagogical projectsdeveloped in link with the external evaluation, and they stimulated thedevelopment of social structures largely centered on the externalevaluation. The social interactions developing locally in district Bhelped the teachers more than in district A to make sense retrospectivelyof their individual and collective performance and participated to theinternalization of the cognitive principles underlying the externalevaluation organized by the inspectors. As a result, in dictrict B,organizational and pedagogical routines have changed more deeply,evaluation tools became more legitimate and represented also higherstakes for teachers and principals. The present study makes a contribution to the theorization ofinstitutional change in three ways. First, it gives substance to aconceptualization of the institutional change that contrasts with the ideathat the institutionalization, as a deterministic process, would operateessentially through isomorphic pressures (Di Maggio & Powell, 1983;Meyer & Rowan, 1977), but also with the one that the institutionalchange would be largely driven by institutional entrepreneurs who havethe resources and the skills to realize their interests and remakeinstitutions accordingly (Fligstein, 2001). Our results show indeed thatthe institutionalization of the external evaluation in District B operatesthrough the agency exercised by individuals, but that this agency isdistributed over different types of actors (the inspectors, the principalsand the teachers). Certainly inspectors as well as school principals inDistrict B can be described as institutional entrepreneurs who initiate
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and promote an output­based regulation, partly in order to maximizetheir own interests (e.g., re­appropriate the pedagogical domainconfiscated by recent reforms of their status) and increase their controlon the teaching practices. But our analyses emphasize mainly that theinstitutionalization is a more complex process, which largely depend onthe nature of the social interactions initiated by the inspectors and thedevelopment of local forms of “self­reinforcing feedback dynamics ofheightened legitimacy and deeper taken­for­grantedness” (Colyvas &Powell, 2006, p. 305). What matters are the social exchanges, alliances,commitments of the actors involved. The networking between schoolsprincipals and inspectors are in fact forms of social alliance andreciprocities that reinforce the process of institutionalization of theoutput­based regulation. Second, it renews the discussion related to the forces that stimulatethe institutional change. The dominant view of institutional change isthat it is evolutionary and driven by organizational competition (Ingram& Clay, 2000). By showing that the network mode of implementationincreases the recoupling through the internalization of the cognitiveprinciples underlying the accountability policies, this study tends toemphasize that horizontal patterns of exchange between theorganizations of a given field belonging to a common space is positivelyassociated with the institutionalization of the output­based regulation inDistrict B. This finding opens a new important field of enquiryconcerning the nature of collaborative and horizontal exchange betweenorganizations that would drive the institutional change. Research oninstitutions and networks has proceeded on largely separate trajectoriesover the past few decades (Owen­Smith and Powell, 2008). The presentstudy makes a first contribution in this sense, by pointing out thatcompetitive and collaborative relationships between the organizationsare not exclusive. We could indeed suggest that a side­effect linked tothe collaboration between organizations in District B is thereinforcement of the competitive relationships between them, inparticular because the accountability rationale is basically comparativeand competitive. It appeared indeed that most teachers in District Bgave much credit to the relative value of their performance andperceived the space of comparison as legitimate, while teachers fromDistrict A criticized the meaning of the comparison process and the
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necessity of it to make sense of their results. Set differently, it could beargued that the horizontal patterns of exchange between organizationsreinforce and legitimize the competitive forces which in turn drive theinstitutional change. Third our study shows that the organizational analysis of theinstitutionalization process cannot be limited to the study of thereform’s reception at the organizational level, but needs to be opened tothe interactions between the organizations, the “intermediaries” and theinstitutional field. Most studies using neo­institutional theory in the fieldof education to analyze the implementation of educational policies(Coburn, 2001, 2006; Spillane et al., 2011) limited the scope of theirinvestigation to the intra­organizational factors and dynamics thatinfluence the institutionalization of reforms and the sense given to themby the teachers. The results of the present study (despite being analyzedonly at the micro level) make appear that the institutionalization is betterdescribed as a multi­level process incorporating macro (institutional),mezzo (organizational), and micro (intraorganizational) levels ofanalysis (Cooney, 2007), since the social and cognitive dynamics atwork at the micro level showed to be largely connected to the process ofimplementation, at the meso­level. That conception of theinstitutionalization as a multi­level process makes particularly importantto understand the processes by which the different “scenes” becomeconnected and influence each other. The results of our study are obviously limited in several ways. First,our data provides only a cross­section and not a view of theinstitutionalization process over time. The longitudinal aspect of changeis only captured through the perception of the teachers. But repeatingobservations and interviews would have certainly increased the validityof the results analyzed here. Second, the paper does not present detailedanalyses of the implementation processes (bureaucratic vs. network) atthe meso­level in the two Districts (for this kind of analyses, see citationremoved), and how they relate to the institutionalization of the policy atthe school level. It only captures these connections by contrasting socialand cognitive correlates observed at the micro­level. Nonetheless,linking more directly both levels of analyses would reinforce theunderstanding of the mechanisms through which “inter­organizationalnetworks serve as conduits for the diffusion of practices and ideas”
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(Owen and Powell, 2008, p.596), or the way by which bureaucraticprocesses affect the reception of policies in education. Third, the studydoes not explore the mid and long­term consequences of theaccountability policies on the teachers’ practices and morale. The studyshowed that teachers in the District B were not highly critique vis­à­visthe external evaluation and its implications for the alignment of theirclass practices. But that would be important to investigate whether thisre­coupling maintains over time and becomes taken­for­granted, orgives way to resistance by the teachers (Hallet, 2010). These lastconsiderations emphasizes that the main implications of the presentstudy are not so much for the accountability polices per se, for whichthe benefits remain unclear (Lee, 2008), but for the design ofeducational policies.
Notes
1 This article has been prepared thanks to the support of the European Union's SixthFramework Programme for Research ­ Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge­basedSociety theme (contract nr 028848­2 ­ project KNOWandPOL). The information andviews set out in this publication are those of the authors only and do not necessarilyreflect the official opinion of the European Union.2 The term “district” is used in this paper to make reference to a local geographicalentity and not to a local authority or an intermediate administration. It will be laterexplained that the regulation of the educational system in the French­speakingCommunity of Belgium is rather centred on the repartition of the authority between theState and different competent authorities than on a territorial basis.3 Competent authorities are differentiated from one another by philosophicaldifferences. Four educational “networks” coexist in French Belgium: the State networkof the French Community of Belgium, the network of local public authorities (towns,municipalities and provinces), the réseau de l’enseignement libre confessionnel (thedenominational education network, primarily Catholic) and the réseau d’enseignementlibre non confessionnel (the non­denominational education network).4 The “pedagogical advices” (pistes didactiques) is an official document that follows thetests and that propose pedagogical advices on the basis of the result and the morecommon errors.5 The inspectors explained that they did not wish to enlarge the geographical districtcovered by the mechanism. All the inspectors involved adhered to the initial project andthe vast majority of the schools, who had the opportunity to take part in the evaluationsvoluntarily, participated in the mechanism.
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6 The groups were: solids and figures; numbers; magnitudes and data processing;reading; writing; listening; scientific awareness; historical awareness; geographicalawareness and computers. The latter group did not formulate an evaluation question buttook responsibility for the computer tools needed for the mechanism to work properly(encoding table, macros) and developed a web site.7 In foundational education, the teaching is organized into three cycles (“cycle 1”corresponding to grades 1 and 2, “cycle 2” to grades 3 and 4 and “cycle 3” to grades 5and 6).
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Appendix: Coding matrices
Coding matrix for the social practices, roles and categories
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Low Medium High
Social practices(teachercollaboration, workdivision andcoordination, etc.)
Social practicesrelated to the externalevaluation are codedas low if they aredescribed by theteachers asidiosyncratic and rare(1 per 3 months).
Social practicesrelated to the externalevaluation are codedas medium if they aredescribed by theteachers as ratherorganized and quitefrequent (1 permonth).
Social practicesrelated to the externalevaluation are codedas high if they areclearly scripted andfrequent (more than 1per month).
Roles Roles related to theexternal evaluationare coded as low if itis not determinedwho, in the school,communicate theresults, analyze themand organize theresponses to them.
Roles related to theexternal evaluationare coded as mediumif some of them onlyare systematicallyassigned to a personor to a group ofpersons.
Roles related to theexternal evaluationare coded as high if itis unambiguous whoassume them.
Categories Categories related tothe externalevaluation are codedas low when they arediffuse and varymuch from oneteacher to another.
Categories related tothe externalevaluation are codedas medium whensome teachers sharecategories to makesense of the externalevaluation.
Categories related tothe externalevaluation are codedas high when morethan 2/3 of theteachers intervieweduse commoncategories to describeand make sense ofthe externalevaluation.
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Coding matrix for the social practices, roles and categories
Definition Examples from the interviews
Symbolicadaptation The symbolic adaptation of theclassroom practices to theexternal evaluation does not affectclassroom routines, organization,use of materials, or approaches toinstruction.
“We (I and my 6th gradecolleague) confront students tonew types of items and questionsto prepare them to the externalevaluation …We also use tests ofthe preceding school years forthat, but never for planninglessons.” (Teacher A3 – 32).Decoupling Classroom practices are unrelatedto the external evaluation. “I do not find the results useful.We even do not communicatethem to the parents. The same istrue for the “pedagogical advices”associated with the results; weeven do not consult them.”(Teacher A3 – 13).
Assimilation Changes in classroom practicesrelated to the external evaluationfit the teachers’ preexistingpractices.
“The external evaluationinfluences the way I teach – how Iplan the lesson and choose thematerial ­, but you know, mostlyin the way I already intended toteach”(Teacher B1 – C2).Accommodation Changes in classroom practicesmodify substantially the teachers’preexisting practices.
“It is clear that the external testsmodify my approach to teachingand the way I conceive somelearning sequences. Let’s take theexample of the “measurementcompetences” in mathematics.More than before now, we useexamples taken from the real lifeas departure point. We also try tomake more connections (in thelearning process) between thedifferent types of measurementcompetences … Indeed I mixdifferent approaches to teaching.And I select the most appropriateas a function of my objectives”(Teacher B3 – C3).
Coding matrix for the types of legitimacy
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Low Medium High
Cognitive legitimacyThe cognitivelegitimacy of theexternal evaluation iscoded as low ifprinciples associatedwith the output­basedregulation areexplicitly criticizedby the teachers.
The cognitivelegitimacy of theexternal evaluation iscoded as medium ifprinciples associatedwith the output­basedregulation arepartially questionedbut globallyaccepted.
The cognitivelegitimacy of theexternal evaluation iscoded as high ifprinciples associatedwith the output­basedregulation areunquestioned andconsidered as natural.
Pragmaticlegitimacy The pragmaticlegitimacy of theexternal evaluation iscoded as low if theprocedure of theexternal evaluation(test taking, testcorrection, results’communication, etc.)is explicitlycontested.
The pragmaticlegitimacy of theexternal evaluation iscoded as medium ifthe procedure of theexternal evaluation ispartially questioned.
The pragmaticlegitimacy of theexternal evaluation iscoded as high if theprocedure of theexternal evaluation isconsidered as “taken­for­granted”.
Moral legitimacy The moral legitimacyof the externalevaluation is codedas low when teachersmake reference tosocial values in orderto judge the externalevaluationnegatively.
The moral legitimacyof the externalevaluation is codedas medium whenteachers mention thatthe externalevaluation onlypartially fit some oftheir social values.
The moral legitimacyof the externalevaluation is codedas high whenteachers mention thatthe externalevaluation makespossible to reachobjectives anchoredin their social values(most often theequality oftreatment).
